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Abstract
An item of your personal information is inversely private if some
party has access to it but you do not. We analyze the provenance of in-
versely private information and its rise to dominance over other kinds
of personal information. In a nutshell, the inverse privacy problem
is unjustified inaccessibility to you of your inversely private informa-
tion. We argue that the inverse privacy problem has a market-based
solution.
1 Introduction
Call an item of your personal information inversely private if some party has
access to it but you do not. The provenance of your inversely private informa-
tion can be totally legitimate. Your interactions with various institutions—
employers, municipalities, financial institutions, health providers, police, toll
roads operators, grocery chains, etc.—create numerous items of personal in-
formation, e.g., shopping receipts and refilled prescriptions. Due to progress
in technology, institutions have become much better than you in recording
data. As a result, shared data decays into inversely private. More inversely
private information is produced when institutions analyze your private data.
Your inversely private information, whether collected or derived, allows
institutions to serve you better. But access to that information—especially if
it were presented to you in a convenient form—would do you much good. It
would allow you to correct possible errors in the data, to have a better idea
of your health status and your credit rating, and to identify ways to improve
your productivity and quality of life.
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In some cases, the inaccessibility of your inversely private information
can be justified by the necessity to protect the privacy of other people and
to protect the legitimate interests of institutions. We argue that there are
numerous scenarios where the chances to hurt other parties are negligible.
The inaccessibility of your inversely private information in such safe scenarios
is the inverse privacy problem. A good solution of the problem should not
only provide you accessibility to your inversely private information but should
also make that access convenient.
We analyze the root causes of the inverse privacy problem and discuss a
market-based solution for it. We concentrate here on the big picture, leaving
many finer points for later analysis.
In §2, we define your personal information. Our definition is relatively
narrow but appropriate for the problem at hand. In §3, we give an access-
based classification of your personal information. In §4, we discuss the prove-
nance of personal information. In §5, we discuss the rise of inversely private
information to dominance over the other kinds of personal information. In
§6, we discuss the inaccessibility of your inversely private information, and
we posit the Inverse Privacy Entitlement Principle. In §7, we formulate and
discuss the inverse privacy problem. Finally, in §8, we discuss a market-based
solution of the inverse privacy problem and related issues.
Some explanations are more natural in a dialog, and so the reader will
find below some discussions between Quisani, ostensibly a former student of
the first author, and the authors, speaking one at at time.
2 Personal infoset
For brevity, items of information are called infons [10].
An infon is tangible if it has a material embodiment, e.g., written down on
a piece of paper or recorded in some database. The same infon (as an abstract
item of information) may have distinct material embodiments. Herein we
restrict attention to infons that are tangible.
We are interested in scenarios where a person interacts with an institution,
e.g. a shop, a medical office, a government agency. We say that an infon x
is personal to an individual P if (a) x is related to an interaction between P
and an institution and (b) x identifies P . A typical example of such an infon
is a receipt for a credit-card purchase by a customer in a shop.
Define the personal infoset of an individual P to be the collection of all
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infons personal to P . Note that the infoset evolves over time. It acquires
new infons. It may also lose some infons. But, because of the tangibility
restriction, at any given moment, the infoset is finite.
Q: Give me an example of an intangible infon.
A: A fleeting impression that you have of someone who just walked
by you.
Q: What about information announced but not recorded at a
meeting? One can argue that the collective memory of the par-
ticipants is a kind of embodiment.
A: Such a case of unrecorded information becomes less and less
common. People write notes, write emails, tweet, send messages,
use their smartphones to make videos, etc. Companies tend to
tape their meetings. Numerous sensors, such as cameras and mi-
crophones, are commonplace and growing in pervasiveness, even
in conference rooms. But yes, there are border cases as far as tan-
gibility is concerned. At this stage of our analysis, we abstract
them away.
Q: In the shopping receipt example, the receipt may also mention
the salesclerk that helped the customer.
A: The clerk represents the shop on the receipt.
Q: But suppose that something went wrong with that particular
purchase, the customer complained that the salesclerk misled her,
and the shop investigates. In the new context, the person of
interest is the salesclerk. The same infon turns out to be personal
to more than one individual.
A: This is a good point. The same infon may be personal to more
than one individual but we are interested primarily in contexts
where the infon in question is personal to one individual.
3 Classification
The personal infoset of an individual P naturally splits into four buckets.
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1. The directly private bucket comprises the infons that P has access to
but nobody else does.
2. The inversely private bucket comprises the infons that some party has
access to but P does not.
3. The partially private bucket comprises the infons that P has access to
and a limited number of other parties do as well.
4. The public bucket comprises the infons that are public information.
Q: Why do you call the second bucket “inversely private”?
A: The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “inverse” as “opposite
in order, nature, or effect.” The description of bucket 2 is the
opposite of that of bucket 1.
Q: As far as I can see, you discuss just two dimensions of privacy:
whom a given infon is personal to, and who has access to the infon.
The world is more complex, and there are other dimensions to
privacy. Consider for example the pictures in the directly private
bucket of my infoset that are personal to me only. Some of the
pictures are clearly more private than others; there are degrees of
privacy.
A: Indeed we restrict attention to the two dimensions. But this
restricted view is informative, and it allows us to carry on our
analysis. Recall that we concentrate here on the big picture leav-
ing many finer points for later analysis.
Q: Concerning the public bucket of my infoset, how can public
information be personal? Personal and public are the opposites.
A: Recall the two privacy dimensions that we do take into ac-
count. There is no contradiction between being personal in one
dimension and public in another.
4 Provenance
With time, the personal infoset of an individual acquires new infons. She
may create new infons on her own, e.g., by making a selfie, by writing down
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some observation, or by writing down some conclusions that she inferred from
information available to her.
But the infoset acquires many more new infons due to the interactions
of the individual with other parties. The other parties could be people, e.g.,
relatives, neighbors, coworkers, clerks, waiters, and medical personnel. They
could be institutions, e.g., employers, banks, internet providers, brick and
mortar shops, online shops, and government agencies. The new infons could
be factual records, gossip, rumors, or derived information.
The infoset may also lose some infons, especially if they have a unique
embodiment. For example, the individual may destroy old letters or delete
a selfie without sending it to anybody. Institutions also may lose or delete
(embodiments of) infons, but in general, these days, institutions are much
better then people in keeping records.
New items of a personal infoset do not necessarily stay in the bucket where
they arose. Because of modern superiority of institutional bookkeeping, there
is a flow of information from the partial privacy bucket to the inverse privacy
bucket. In the next section we look into this dynamics.
5 The rise of inverse privacy to dominance
People have always interacted among themselves, and people have interacted
with institutions for a very long time, certainly from the times that ancient
governments started to collect taxes. Until recently the capacity of a person
to take and keep records was comparable to that of institutions. Yes, the
government kept tax records but, by and large, the people knew about their
taxes as much as the government did. Traditionally, the partial privacy
bucket easily dominated the inverse privacy bucket.
Later on, governments, especially dictatorial governments, could marshal
resources to collect information on people; a novelist illustrated this power the
best [14]. The most radical change, however, is due to technology introduced
in the last 20–30 years. The capacity of public and private institutions to
take and keep records became vastly superior to that of a regular person. As
a result, the large majority of items in the personal infoset is now generated
as inversely or partially private. Often infons start as partially private but
then quickly decay into inversely private because the institutions remember it
all while the person often hardly remembers that the interaction took place.
For a regular citizen of an advanced society today, the volume of the
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inverse privacy bucket vastly exceeds that of the partial privacy bucket. Of
course it may be simplistic to count bits or even items. A picture of a car has
many bits but only so much useful information; even many pictures of the
same car may have only so much useful information. It makes more sense to
speak about the value of information rather than its volume.
Determining the value of personal information is a difficult problem, par-
ticularly because of a gap between what people are willing to pay for keeping
an item of information directly private and what they are willing to accept
for sharing that same item of information; see [1] and its references. Never-
theless, we posit that typically the value of the inverse privacy bucket exceeds
that of the partial privacy bucket and grows much faster.
Thus, in advanced societies today, the inverse privacy bucket of a typical
personal infoset dominates the whole infoset. We see the dominance of inverse
privacy as a problem. In this connection, it is important to understand
legal, political, sociological, ethical, technological implications of the inverse
privacy domination.
It is worth emphasizing that the main reason that we live now in world
dominated by inverse privacy is not the invasion of privacy (the tremendous
importance of that issue notwithstanding) but the gross disparity in the
capability to take and keep records.
6 The inverse privacy entitlement principle
Enterprises have legitimate reason to collect data about their customers; this
allows them to serve their customers better. Medical institutions have legit-
imate reasons to collect data about their patients; this helps them diagnose
and treat diseases. Governments have legitimate reason to collect data about
their citizens; this helps them address societal problems.
As noted earlier, institutions are much better than individuals in collect-
ing data. So, in the process of all the collection of data about customers,
patients, and citizens, partially private data is quickly becoming inversely
private. Aside from any surreptitious collection of personal information, this
conversion of data from partially private to inversely private is critical to the
provenance of inversely private information.
Access to your inversely private infons would allow you to correct possible
errors in the data, to have a better idea of your health status and your credit
rating, and so on and so forth.
6
From an ethical point of view, it is only fair to give you access to your per-
sonal infons. Already the 1973 HEW report [11] advocated that “[t]here must
be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret,”
and “[t]here must be a way for an individual, to find out what information
about him is in a record and how it is used.” And the 1970 Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) stipulated that, subject to various technical excep-
tions, “[e]very consumer reporting agency shall, upon request, . . . clearly and
accurately disclose to the consumer” all information in the consumer’s file,
the sources of the information, etc. [6, §609].
Concentrating on the big picture, we ignore technical exceptions here.
But we cannot ignore that governments have legitimate security concerns,
and businesses have legitimate competition concerns. The 2012 Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) report on Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of
Rapid Change” is more nuanced: “Companies should provide reasonable
access to the consumer data they maintain; the extent of access should be
proportionate to the sensitivity of the data and the nature of its use” [8,
p. 64]. To this end, we posit
The Inverse Privacy Entitlement Principle As a rule, individuals are
entitled to access their personal infons. There may be exceptions, but each
such exception needs to be justified, and the burden of justification is on the
proponents of the exception.
One obvious exception is related to national security. The proponents of
that exception, however, would have to justify it. In particular they would
have to justify which parts of national security fall under the exception.
7 The inverse privacy problem
We say that an institution shares back your personal infons if it gives you
access to them. This technical term will make the exposition easier.
Institutions may be reluctant to share back personal information, and
they may have reasonable justifications: the privacy of other people needs
to be protected, there are security concerns, there are competition concerns.
But there are numerous safe scenarios where the chances are negligible that
sharing back your personal infons would violate the privacy of another person
or damage the legitimate interests of the information holding institution or
any other institution.
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The inverse privacy problem is the inaccessibility to you of your personal
information in such safe scenarios.
Q: Give me examples of safe scenarios.
A: Your favorite supermarket has plentiful data about your shop-
ping there. Do you have that data?
Q: No, I don’t.
A: But, in principle you could have. So how can sharing that
data with you hurt anybody? Similarly, many other businesses
and government institutions have information about you that you
could in principle have but in fact you do not. Some institutions
share a part of your inversely private information with you but
only a part. For example, Fitbit sends you weekly summaries but
they have much more information about you.
Q: As you mentioned earlier, institutions have not only raw data
about me but also derived information. I can imagine that some
of that derived information may be sensitive.
A: Yes, there may be a part of your inversely private information
that is too sensitive to be shared with you. Our position is,
however, that the burden of proof is on the information holding
institution.
Q: You use judicial terminology. But who is the judge here?
A: The ultimate judge is society.
Q: Let me raise another point. Enabling me to access my in-
versely private information makes it easier for intruders to find
information about me.
A: This is true. Any technology invented to allow inverse privacy
information to be shared back has to be made secure. Commu-
nication channels have to be secure, encryption has to be secure,
etc. Note, however, that today hackers are in a much better po-
sition to find your inversely private information about you than
you are. Sharing that information with you should improve the
situation.
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8 Going forward
As we pointed out above, the inverse privacy problem is not simply the
result of ill will of governments or businesses. It is primarily a side effect
of technological progress. Technology influences the social norms of privacy
[17]. In this particular case, technology created the problem, and technology
is instrumental in solving it. In this section, we argue that the inverse privacy
problem can be solved and will be solved. By default we restrict attention
to safe scenarios of §7.
8.1 Social norms
Individuals would greatly benefit from gaining access to their inversely pri-
vate infons. They will have a much fuller picture of their health, their shop-
ping history, places they visited, and so on. Besides, they would have an
opportunity to correct possible errors in inversely private infons.
To what extent do people understand the great benefits of accessing their
inversely private infons? We do not have data on the subject. Here’s one
indication [12, §4.2.2].
We asked participants to [t]hink about the ability to view and edit
the information that advertising companies know about you. How
much do you agree or disagree with the following, showing them
six statements. 90% of participants believed (agreed, strongly
agreed) that they should be given the opportunity to view and
edit their profiles. A large percentage wanted to be able to decide
what advertising companies can collect about them (85%) and
saw benefits in being able to view (79%) and edit profiles (81%).
The majority thought that the ability to edit their proles would
provide companies with more accurate data (70%) and allow them
to better serve the participants (64%).
As people realize the benefits in question more and more, they will de-
mand access to their inversely private infons louder and louder. Indeed, it
is easy to underestimate the amount of information that businesses about a
regular citizen. The story of Austrian privacy activist Max Schrems is in-
structive. “In 2011, Schrems demanded that Facebook give him all the data
the company had about him. This is a requirement of European Union (EU)
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law. Two years later, after a court battle, Facebook sent him a CD with a
1,200-page PDF” [15, Part 1, §1].
Social norms will evolve accordingly, toward a broad acceptance of the
Inverse Privacy Entitlement Principle of §6. Institutions should share back
personal information as a matter of course. Furthermore, they should do so in
a convenient way. Your personal infons should be available to you routinely
and easily—just as the photos that you upload to a reputable cloud store.
You do not have to file a legal request to obtain them.
The evolving social norms influence the law, and the law helps to shape
social norms. For brevity, we restrict attention to the US law. We already
quoted, in §6, the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act, the 1973 HEW report,
and the 2012 FTC report. See also the 2000 report of the FTC Advisory
Committee on Online Access and Security [7], the 2003 Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act [5], California’s “Shine the light” law of 2003 [2],
and the 2014 FTC report “Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Ac-
countability” [9]. Clearly the law favors transparency and facilitates your
access to your inverse private infons.
8.2 Market forces
The sticky point is whether companies will share back our personal informa-
tion. This information is extremely valuable to them. It gives them compet-
itive advantages, and so it may seem implausible that companies will share
it back. We contend that companies will share back personal information
because it will be in their business interests.
Sharing back personal information can be competitively advantageous as
well. Other things being equal, wouldn’t you prefer to deal with a company
that shares your personal infons with you? We think so. Companies will
compete on (a) how much personal data, collected and derived, is shared
back and (b) how convenient that data is presented to customers.
The evolution toward sharing back personal information seems slow. This
will change. Once some companies start sharing back personal data as part
of their routine business, the competitive pressure will quickly force their
competitors to join in. The competitors will have little choice.
There is money to be made in solving the inverse privacy problem. As
sharing back personal information gains ground, the need will arise to mine
large amounts of customers’ personal data on their behalf. The benefits of
owning and processing this data will grow, especially as the data involves
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financial and quality-of-life domains. We anticipate the emergence of a new
market for companies that compete in processing large sets of private data
for the benefits of the data producers, i.e. consumers.
The miners of personal data will work on behalf of consumers and compete
on how helpful they are to the customers, how trustworthy they are. This
emerging market will generate its own pressure on the personal data holders
and potentially might find ways to benefit them as well. For example, if you
shop at some retailer R your personal data minerM may show you a separate
webpage devoted to R, suggest ways for you to save money as you shop there,
and show you how R intends to improve your shopping experience. The last
part may even be written by R, but—working on your behalf—M may also
suggest to you better deals or shopping experiences elsewhere. The retailer
R will benefit if it can beat the competition.
8.3 Better record keeping
Finally, technology can enhance people’s capacity to take and keep records.
For example, your smartphone or wearable device may eventually become a
trusted and universal recorder of many things you do. Technology will help
people maintain a personal diary effortlessly.
The project “Small Data” lead by Deborah Estrin at Cornell Tech [3]
pioneers such an approach in the domain of health. “Consider a new kind
of cloud-based app that would create a picture of your health over time by
continuously, securely, and privately analyzing the digital traces you generate
as you work, shop, sleep, eat, exercise, and communicate” [4].
The “small” in “Small Data” reflects the fact that the personal health-
related data of one individual isn’t big data [18]. In contrast to Estrin’s
work, we do not restrict attention to any particular data vertical. In our
case, inversely private data of an individual may be on the biggish side;
recall the story of Max Schrems above. In fact, “Biggish” is the name of a
technical proposal, and this paper grew up out of Biggish ideas. We intend
to address other Biggish ideas elsewhere.
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